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It is difficult to appreciate adequately a single development project con-
sidered in isolation f rom its environment and f rom the record of similar 
projects elsewhere. To give a sharper focus to our review in this book of 
the achievements of the Mwea Irrigation Settlement, this chapter describes 
the very different history of effort and expenditure on a sister scheme whidi 
was started at the same time and for much the same reasons as Mwea. The Per-
kerra Irrigation Scheme is located in the Rift Valley nor th of N a k u r u (see 
Chap te r A, Fig. 1). Like Mwea it is operated by the Na t iona l Irrigation 
Board, but it differs f rom Mwea in many respects. The most obvious contrast 
is its abysmal economic record. Among agricultural development projects 
which have survived their first decade of life it must rank as exceptionally 
uneconomic. By mid-1968, fifteen years after it was started, it had cost over 
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£500,000 ' for 1,226 acres irrigated by tenants2 and required a protected 
market for its produce and an annual subsidy of the order of £24,0003 . Un-
like many projects which have run into difficulties, its problems in the latter 
1960s cannot be attr ibuted to deficiencies of management. Indeed, much ma-
nagerial ability and effort had gone into achieving even this poor economic 
level. Rather the origins of the Scheme's problems can be found in its environ-
ment and history, an examination of which will reveal some of the types of 
difficulties into which a project can run, and f rom which a number of lessons 
can be d rawn. 
I. H i s t ó r i c a ! N a r r a t i v e 
Like many government agricultural projects, the Perkerra Irr igation Scheme 
grew out of ecological change. The river which gives the Scheme its ñame 
has a steep and broken catchment area of about 600 square miles, ranging 
f rom over 8,000 feet where it rises on the western wall of the Rift Valley 
down to 3,200 feet where it enters Lake Baringo4 . The mean annual rainfall 
varies f rom over 50 inches in the high forests to less than 30 inches at Mari -
gat where the river leaves a gorge and enters alluvial plains near the lake5. 
In the latter nineteenth century these plains were the scene of irr igation f rom 
the Perkerra river carried out by the Njemps people, a N i lo -Hami t i c group 
related to the Masai, who provided a staging post and source of food 
supplies to early European explorers. The Njemps raised the level of the 
water in the river by means of a brushwood barrier and spread it over 
the surrounding fíat land. Although the barrier had to be replaced after 
1 See T a b l e 2 on page 350 fo r a b r e a k d o w n and exp l ana t i on . " O v e r £ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 " 
represents cap i t a l and recur ren t e x p e n d i t u r e less revenue, bu t does no t include 
deprec ia t ion . N o capi ta l r e p a y m e n t or interest d iarges have ever been p a i d by 
the Scheme. 
2 This to ta l is der ived f r o m the P e r k e r r a I r r iga t ion Sdieme A n n u a l R e p o r t fo r 
1967/68 which gives 343 tenan t s w i t h 2-acre hold ings and 135 t enan t s w i t h 
4 -ac re holdings . 
3 In 1967/68 the g ran t f r o m the H e a d Of f ice of the N a t i o n a l I r r i ga t i on B o a r d was 
£25 ,401 (Nac iona l I r r iga t ion Board Accounts fo r the Y e a r E n d i n g 30/6/68 
[mimeo] , N a i r o b i , 28. 8. 68). The m e a n ope ra t ing loss for the six financial years 
1962/63 to 1967/68 was £23 ,580 (see T a b l e 2). 
4 For a m a p showing the ca tchment see J . C . DE WILDE et al., Experiences with 
Agricultural Development in Tropical Africa, Volume II: The Case Studies, The 
Johns H o p k i n s Press, Bal t imore , 1967, p . 158. C h a p t e r 5, " T h e Expe r i ence in 
the Dis t r ic ts of Bar ingo and E l g e y o - M a r a k w e t " , gives a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n 
abou t the area and its h is tory . 
5 More de ta i led physical and agr icu l tu ra ! i n f o r m a t i o n can be f o u n d in "Dis t r i c t 
Gaze tee r , Ba r ingo" , (mimeo) , by the Dis t r i c t Agr i cu l tu r a l Of f i ce r , Bar ingo 
Dis t r ic t , Second Edi t ion Revised, O c t o b e r 1961. 
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seasonal floods, the records of early explorers and the fact that the Njemps 
established two permanent villages suggest that the system was stable6. 
This equilibrium was upset by the European presence in the early twentieth 
century and a sequence of events which destroyed the irrigation system. 
First, tribal raiding was reduced and human and stock populations increased. 
As a result the high grass which had dominated much of the Perkerra catch-
ment was grazed down and replaced by bush so thick that it became im-
possible to ride a horse through it7. At the same time, the surface water run-
off increased, and erosion became marked on the steep slopes of the catch-
ment. As the river became flashier, so irrigation became more difficult. 
The climax carne in 1918 when a flood changed the course of the river8. 
Attempts to rebuild the barrier failed, and from that time onwards the 
Njemps ceased to irrígate at Marigat and became pastoralists instead. But 
then severe overgrazing, the droughts of the latter 1920s, and the locust in-
vasions which followed them, combined to produce a crisis in which the Gov-
ernment found it necessary to support the Njemps with famine relief. 
This crisis, requiring Government intervention and expenditure, attracted 
official interest and provided an opportunity for ideas for an irrigation pro-
ject. At first, in keeping with the style of the conservation era of colonial 
development, the aim was to restore what had been rather than to innóvate: 
two attempts, both unsuccessful, were made to replace the Njemps ' brush-
wood weir with a dam of sacks. These failures and the continuing plight of 
the Njemps encouraged bolder proposals. In 1933 the Sénior Agricultural 
6 For accoun ts of some visits by ear ly explorers see J . THOMSON, Through Masai-
land, A Journey of Exploration among the Snowclad Volcanic Mountains and 
Strange Tribes of Eastern Eqiiatorial Africa, London , Sampson L o w , Mar s ton , 
Sear le and R i v i n g t o n , 1885, pp . 400 -402 and 5 2 6 - 5 2 9 ; E. C . DAWSON, ed., The 
Last Journals of Bishop Hannington, L o n d o n , Seeley, 1888, p p . 1 9 5 - 1 9 6 ; L u d w i g 
R i t t e r von HOHNEL, The Discovery by Count Teleki of Lakes Rudolf and Stepha-
nie, L o n d o n , L o n g m a n ' s G a r e n and C o m p a n y , 1894, Vol . I, p p . 433 -34 and 
Vol . I I , p p . 1 - 5 ; and C. PETERS, New Light on Dark Africa: being the Narrative 
of the Germán Emin Pasha Expedition, L o n d o n , W a r d , Lock and C o m p a n y , 
1891, p p . 2 6 8 - 2 7 7 . O n 8th J a n u a r y 1890 PETERS conc luded a t r e a t y w i t h thé 
N j e m p s u n d e r which N j e m p s and B a r i n g o t e r r i t o ry were ceded t o him w i t h a 
reques t t ha t it receive G e r m á n Pro tec t ion . PETERS said t ha t he f o u n d the N j e m p s 
p e o p l e " in te l l igen t and submissive" (p. 273). Whi le there is no reason to t h i n k 
t h a t he h a d an i r r iga t ion scheme in mind , it is in teres t ing t h a t he f a v o u r e d the 
e s t ab l i shment of a s t a t ion and believed tha t it " w o u l d ve ry soon p a y fo r itself as 
a commerc i a l f a c t o r y " (p. 273). E x t r a c t s f r o m ear ly exp lo re r s ' accoun ts have 
been b r o u g h t toge the r in an unpubl i shed m o n o g r a p h by Mrs . R . T . LAMBERT, " A 
Po l i t i ca l H i s t o r y of Ba r ingo and E l d a m a R a v i n e " , c. 1951, which also conta ins 
much else of in teres t concern ing the h is tory of the a rea . 
7 Kenya Land Commission, Evidence and Memoranda, Co lon ia l N o . 91, L o n d o n , 
H M S O , 1934, Vol . I I pp . 1805-08 , evidence of M r . M . BLUNDELL, and p p . 
1820-22 , ev idence given by M r . D . H . STANNING. 
8 Ib id . , p. 1910, ev idence given by M r . E. B. HOSKING, O.B.E . 
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Chemist, after describing the desert conditions and the scores of freshly 
stripped skeletons of cattle he had seen around a manyatta at Marigat, 
considered the possibilities of piecemeal assistance to a number of small irri-
gation schemes on various rivers. But, he asked: "Is it really worth while 
considering such small practically individual projects?" And he backed his 
conclusión that "There is a very good prospect of a really big project being 
successfully run" with proposals for a barrage in the Perkerra gorge0. N o 
immediate action was taken, but his report was followed up in 1936 by a 
more detailed survey by two engineers, CARRICK and TETLEY 1 0 . Although 
they found that the flows in the river varied dramatically between 3'/2 
cusecs and 55,000 cusecs, they recommended construction of a weir and 
the settlement of Njemps and neighbouring Tugen on a scheme which would 
irrigate 3,000 acres. The capital cost they estimated at £16,000, with a 
recurrent cost of £1,600 a year. Since this recurrent cost would be less 
than the annual commitment for famine relief, they argued that the project 
would be justified. 
From this time onwards, it is as though the idea of irrigation from the 
Perkerra river had a life of its own. At first it was championed by the 
Director of Public Works, who tried to seize two opportunities to implement 
a scheme. The first came in 1940, with the promise of abundant capital 
f rom Colonial Development and Welfare Funds. The second was in 1943, 
with the promise of abundant labour from Italian prisoners of war. But 
on both occasions the Administration vetoed the proposal, arguing that 
staff were short, that there were better alternative uses for the resources 
required, and that settlement of both Tugen and Njemps on the same 
scheme would be acceptable to neither. After the end of the war, however, 
the Administration began to show interest, if in a somewhat confused way. 
The Provincial Commissioner (PC) wrote in 1946: "It is simply appalling 
the way water goes to waste. I cannot comment on the various schemes 
which the experts have put up from time to time, as I cannot find much on 
the files in this office"11. Although the 1936 CARRICK and TETLEY report had 
been lost, it was known about, and the idea of an irrigation project 
stayed alive. The Scheme's birth in 1953 was premature and unplanned, 
precipitated by crisis. 
During the early stages of the Mau Mau Emergency, Kikuyu, Ernbu and 
Meru people were being "repatriated" f rom the Rift Valley Province to the 
Central Province from which they or their parents had originated; but 
when they arrived there many had no land or other means of subsistence. 
9 Sénior Agr i cu l t u r a l Chemis t , " R e p o r t on P o r t i o n of the K a m a s i a a n d N j e m p s 
N a t i v e Reserve w i t h Special R e f e r e n c e to I r r i g a t i o n Possibi l i t ies" , 29. 4. 33. 
10 H . E . CARRICK and A. E. TETLEY, " T h e P e r k e r r a R ive r I r r i ga t i on P r o j e c t " , 
25. 6. 36. 
11 Le t te r , P C Rif t Va l ley P r o v i n c e to R . P. A r m i t a g e , 13. 4. 46. 
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The PC, Rift Valley Province, pressed on both security and humanitarian 
grounds for camps for them to be set up within his province. Permission was 
given over the telephone, allowing the P C only 36 hours in which to decide 
where to site the first camp. 
H e called together departmental heads, administrative officers, and the 
Member of Legisiative Council, and various proposals - quarrying, bush 
clearing, forest planting - were considered. None, however, was specific 
enough to indícate a definite site for a camp. But the District Commissioner 
(DC) Baringo favoured Marigat so that the labour could be used to 
improve the road to Nakuru and also perhaps for irrigation. Marigat was 
agreed, but the decisión had been on where to site a camp rather than on 
implementing an irrigation scheme12. 
Commitment to the Scheme carne about not so much through identifiable 
decisions as through a flow of events. After the detainees had been moved 
in and had begun working, road construction gave diminishing returns as la-
bour had to work further and further f rom the camp. Then, when the 1936 
report was eventually found, it emerged that the camp had been sited on 
the wrong side of the Perkerra river. The camp water supply which carne 
f rom the neighbouring Molo river dried up, and both to obtain water and 
to concéntrate work more economically on irrigation the camp was moved 
closer to the irrigation site. In the meantime the idea of irrigation fired 
the enthusiasm of officials who were soon talking of the Perkerra Irrigation 
Scheme in optimistic terms. In the words of the Annual Report of the De-
partment of Agriculture for 1953: 
" A W o r k s C a m p f o r displaced K i k u y u was establ ished at M a r i g a t to cons t ruc t an 
i r r iga t ion cana l f r o m the P e r k e r r a r iver o n t o the N j e m p s fíats, w h e r e an ini t ia l 
i r r i ga t ion scheme of 3,000 acres m a y later be ex t ended to 6,000 acres."1 3 
Over the years of construction work on the Scheme achievements were 
disappointing. As Table 1 shows, acreages prepared for irrigation consistently 
fell below the targets set. 
Ñor , in the period up to 1959, was the settlement of tenants as effective as 
hoped. The first 47 Njemps and Tugen tenants carne to the scheme in 1956, 
and their numbers swelled to 241 in 1958. But then many left or were dis-
missed, leaving only 114 at the end of 1959. Cultivation during this period 
was also beset with difficulties. Maize, groundnuts and tomatoes were tried 
but none of these gave any lasting hope of making the Scheme economically 
viable. Capital and recurrent costs were high and revenue negligible14. 
In these circumstances, the position was reviewed in 1959 and the Scheme 
12 I n t e r v i e w w i t h the P C , (1965). 
13 Department oj Agriculture Annual Report jor 1953, N a i r o b i , G o v e r n m e n t 
P r i n t e r , p. 55. 
14 See T a b l e 2 on p a g e 350. 
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Table 1. D e v e l o p m e n t T a r g e t s a n d A c h i e v e m e n t s 
Y e a r [ a r e e t w a s set Y t a r ' o r t a r B e t T a r g e t acreage to be A c r e a g e r e p o r t e d 
a c h i e v e m e n t p r e p a r e d f o r i r r i g a t i o o p r e p a r e d at t a r g e t d a t e 
1953 uns ta ted 3,000, later perhaps -
6,000 
1955 1956 1,500 1,000 
1956 1958 3,000 1,195 
1958 1959 1,600 1,162 
Sonrces: Department of Agriculture Annual Reports and Perker ra I r r iga t ion Sdieme 
Annua l Repor ts . 
Note: The acreages repor ted p repa red in 1955 and 1956 were later recognised to be 
exaggerated because of surveying errors, inclusión of land in developed areas 
which could not be i r r igated, and inclusión of land which was not fu l ly 
p repa red . 
was placed on a care and maintenance basis for three years at the end of 
which time a decisión was to be taken about its future . 
In 1962, after the three years, there was considerable discussion15 about 
whether to cióse down, maintain or expand the Scheme. In f avour of closure 
it was argued that the Scheme was technically unjustifiable because of the 
small and unreliable river flow; that there was still no crop on which its 
economy could securely be based; that an annual loss of between £15,000 
and £19,000 would be saved; and that if the Scheme was to be wound up 
it should be done without delay before it became par t of the established life 
of the district. Against closure it was argued that there was a moral obliga-
tion to the tenants; that the tenants would have to be resettled elsewhere if 
the Scheme were abandoned; that the £365,000 already spent would have 
to be writ ten off; and tha t the Scheme's maize production would cease and 
it might be necessary to resume famine relief in the area. Moreover , the 
Scheme was proving popular and there was a waiting list of 150 potential 
tenants. The Chief Agriculturalist pointed out that al though only 430 acres 
were being cultivated, a total of 1,750 acres had to varying degrees been 
developed and the balance of 1,320 acres could be brought into product ion 
for a relatively small addi t ional cost. H e fur ther argued tha t expansión 
would reduce the annual loss to Government . The decisión hung in the 
balance: in April 1962 a meeting of sénior officials advised that the Scheme 
should be closed down; in May they supported a decisión tha t it should 
expand. 
From 1955 onwards another more ambitious idea was occasionally consider-
ed. A water storage dam might provide a more reliable water supply and 
15 This pa rag raph and subsequent historical pa ragraphs are based upon Department 
of Agriculture Annual Reports, Pe rker ra I r r igat ion Sdieme A n n u a l Repor t s , 
Minutes of the Pe rke r ra I r r iga t ion Sdieme Commit tee , and various m e m o r a n d a , 
letters, and personal interviews. 
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allow a much larger acreage to be irrigated. A site was identified and in 
1960 the Cliief Hydrau l i c Engineer estimated the ultímate irrigation potential 
of the catchment at 16,000 acres and the cost of developing this potential 
by means of a storage dam at between £ 3 million and £ 5 million. Siltlng 
would be acute and the life of the reservoir would only be about th i r ty 
years. After the 1962 decisión to expand the Scheme, however, fu r ther ex-
plorat ion revealed another site higher up the catchment where the silt load 
was much less. A dam built there to store enough water to irrígate 6,400 
acres was estimated at about £1 million, and for a time there seemed a 
possibility of surveys for a very much larger project. The planners and 
agriculturalists had higher priorities, however, and the proposal was 
shelved. 
Tab l e 2. F i n a n c e a n d S e t t l e m e n t 
(15 (2) (3) (4 ) n ( 5 ) . ( 6 ) 
C a p i t a l R e c u r r e n t D e p r í c i a t i o n " R e v e n u e U p e r a t i n g T o t a l 
f í- £ r. Losses in £ ~ 
£ £ £ £ ( 2 ) + ( 3 ) _ ( 4 ) T e n a n t s 
1954 
1955 } 86,336 21,588 1,727 N i l 23,315 
-
1956 33,546 16,490 2,398 N i l 18,888 47 
1957 55,016 22,213 3,498 500 25,211 72 
1958 32,777 16,145 4,153 800 19,498 241 
1959 9,675 31,060 4,347 2,100 33,307 114 
1960 2,771 16,313 4,402 2,640 18,075 99 
1961 3,045 14,460 4,463 2,405 16,518 128 
1962 7,221 20,218 4,608 2,021 22,805 326 
1963 14,241 31,906 4,892 13,232 23,566 334 
1964 6,198 35,580 5,017 7,114 33,483 362 
1965 10,940 44,790 5,236 33,197 16,829 402 
1966 8,447 27,156" 7,788 15,545" 19,399 503 
1967 3,202 34,464" 6,357 15,420" 25,401 481 
To ta l s 273,415 332,383 58,886 94,974 296,295 _ 
" D e p r e c i a t i o n does n o t inc lude the i r r iga t ion works . Were they i n d u d e d , de-
prec ia t ion and o p e r a t i n g losses w o u l d be subs tant ia l ly higher . 
b R e c u r r e n t e x p e n d i t u r e and r evenue figures for 1966/67 and 1967/68 are l o w e r 
because of the exclusión of Í tems such as fert i l isers and insecticides which were in 
and out Ítems and which p rev ious ly a p p e a r e d in both columns. 
Sources: C o l u m n s (1) t o (5), le t ter f r o m Genera l M a n a g e r , N a t i o n a l I r r i g a t i o n 
Board , 24. 10. 68 ; co lumn (6), annua l repor ts of the P e r k e r r a I r r i g a t i o n . 
Scheme and also Department of Agriculture Annual Reports. 
Notes: T h e financial yea r r a n f r o m l s t Ju ly to 30th June . F inanc ia l f igures r e f e r 
tx> the financial years end ing on 30th June of the next yea r t o come. Thus , . 
cap i ta l e x p e n d i t u r e fo r the y e a r 1956/57 was £33 ,546 . 
T e n a n t figures are fo r 31st December of the year agains t which they 
appea r , except fo r the 1967 and 1968 figures which are fo r 30th June . 
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In the meantime the Scheme was being expanded. At the end of 1962 
840 acres were reported to be "developed", and by the end of 1963 the 
figure had risen to 1,381 acres. More tenants were settled and by mid-1967 
there were over 500. After early disease control problems had been largely 
overcome through spraying, onion production became the main cash crop, 
with maize still grown for tenants' subsistence. Mechanical cultivation, cen-
trally controlled by the scheme management, was coordinated with activi-
ties carried out by tenants10. The acreage of onions cropped was increased 
from 62 in the 1961/62 season to 673 in 1967/68 and yields rose in the same 
period f rom 0.58 to 3.52 tons per acre. But the very success of onion pro-
duction under the high cost conditions of Perkerra created severe problems 
of marketing. The economy of the Scheme had been staked on one crop, 
but competition from cheaper growers depressed the onion market and by 
mid-1968 the gamble on onions appeared to have failed and the search 
for new crops was intensified. 
By mid-1968 the capital cost of Perkerra had been £273,000, the recurrent 
cost not including depreciation £332,000, and the revenue only £95,000. 
The Scheme was kept alive by the National Irrigation Board with a direct 
grant running at about £24,000 per annum. Since much of the revenue of 
the Board was derived from Mwea, this can be seen as a transfer equivalent 
in round figures to £13 from each Mwea tenant each year to provide some 
£50 subsidy each year to each Perkerra tenant. Ñor did it seem likely that 
the fact that Perkerra was in the constituency of a distinguished political 
leader would diminish its chances of survival. It had become a mature dwarf , 
confírmed in its dependence, kept alive by its richer sister, and sustained in 
its search for economic viability by the hope that a near-miracle would 
overcome its structural impediments. 
This brief historical summary has been designed to explain why and how 
the Scheme carne into being, and to describe the bare outlines of its pro-
gress and of the major decisions which have affected it. Every develop-
ment scheme is, of course, unique, and some of the features of Perkerra are 
exceptional. Nevertheless, with this account as a necessary background, an 
examination of the problems encountered over the first fifteen years of the 
life of this scheme will reveal some of the difficulties which can be anticipated 
and hopefully avoided in other agricultural development projects. 
16 See DE WILDE et. al., op. cit., pp . 221—241 fo r observa t ions on the P e r k e r r a and 
M w e a systems of m a n a g e m e n t , especial ly pp . 228 -231 fo r P e r k e r r a . 
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I I . T h e P r o b l e m s E x p e r i e n c e d 
The problems experienced can be separated into those concerned with con-
struction and irr igation; production and market ing; tenant management; 
and government organisation. 
1. C o n s t r u c t i o n a n d I r r iga t ion P r o b l e m s 
The first major construction problem concerned the diversión weir in the 
Perkerra river. Because of the urgency of early implementat ion a temporary 
cement weir was quickly and cheaply constructed. The speed and cheapness 
proved, in the long run, to be expensive. Between 1954 and 1962 almost 
continual repairs were necessary. Flood damage in 1954 was estimated to re-
quire £6,000 to £12,000, and again in 1961 £5,000. In other years there 
were reports of cracking in the weir, and scouring on the lower side under-
mining the whole structure, all of which added to the costs of the pro-
ject. 
The distribution of water and layout of the irrigation system also proved 
difficult and expensive. The ground was more irregular than expected, which 
increased the amount of earth-moving necessary and required the construc-
tion of culverts to carry water over gullies. For four years there was a 
depar tmental difference of opinion about the form of layout to be adopted, 
and over 400 acres levelled into basins had later to be v i r tua l ly abandoned 
for some years to the nutgrass which flourished in the swamp conditions 
they provided. 
Labour and machinery were difficult to control. The physical work of de-
velopment was at first carried out mainly by detainees. The Prisons De-
par tment , which supervised them, was interested in work performance as a 
means to rehabili tation rather than as an end in itself, and tended to 
measure its success in terms of the numbers of detainess who could be re-
leased rather than the numbers who could be kept at work . Development 
was slowed by a sharp rundown in numbers, f r om about 1,000 in 1955 to 
only 200 in 1957, aggravated by delays in the supply of machinery to sub-
stitute for hand labour. Then, when earth-moving machinery did eventually 
arrive, there were problems of finding staff able to mainta in it, of break-
downs, and of recurrent hold-ups waiting for spare parts. 
The most serious irrigation problem, if anything more acute in 1968 than 
in 1954, was the erratic flow of the Perkerra river. The rapid runoff in the 
eroded catchment continued to send sudden floods down the river. These 
damaged the headworks and left heavy silt deposits in the canals and 
feeders. More critical, however, were the periods of water shortage. In the 
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drought of 1961, the flow was down to 3 cusecs. For the first five months 
of that year the entire river flow was extracted and for most of that time 
proved inadequate. The vegetation cover of the catchment area has probably 
deteriorated since the Scheme was started, as the high forest is gradual ly 
cut down and cultivated and as much of the lower catchment is overgrazed. 
In his Annual Report for 1965, the Manager stated tha t : 
" R e p o r t s f r o m the Dis t r ic t R a n g e M a n a g e m e n t Of f ice r , Ba r ingo Dis t r i c t , a re 
pa r t i cu la r ly d is turb ing . (He) repor t s t ha t , as a result of the recen t d r o u g h t , the 
increase in Tugen stock which has encroad ied progressively higher in to the hills has 
laid was te the ent i re ca tchment area . The s i tua t ion is n o w as bad , if no t worse , t h a n 
in 1954. This s tate of affairs , if left unchecked, th rea tens the v e r y existence of the 
P e r k e r r a I r r iga t ion Scheme."1 7 
A year later he wrote : "Whether the Perkerra river will still exist at 
Marigat in another ten years is a matter for conjecture."1 8 
2. P r o d u c t i o n a n d M a r k e t i n g P r o b l e m s 
Although no crop triáis had been carried out when development began, 
they were quickly instituted and several crops grew very well. Unfor tuna te ly , 
they invariably grew less well when cultivated on a wider scale. The first 
crop grown was maize. Initial high yields of 20 bags an acre soon dropped 
to 10 bags and less. The decline was at tr ibuted par t ly to loss of fert i l i ty in 
the soil, but contr ibutory factors were the ravages of bush pig, Grant ' s 
Gazelle, Kavi rondo crane and thieves, all converging upon the Scheme as 
the only abundant food source in what was otherwise virtual desert. 
Since maize was food for tenants and its official market valué was too low 
to make it a possible cash crop, there was during the latter 1950s a search 
for a second more profitable crop which could al ternate wi th maize and 
enable tenants to pay a water rate. Groundnuts were tried, but the seed had 
poor viability and the tenants were uncooperative. A determined a t tempt 
was made to grow tomatoes which were to be supplied to a canning fac-
tory. There can be few hort icultural hazards to which the tomatoes grown 
in 1956, 1957 and 1958 were not subject. The crop was p lanted late. Seed-
lings were destroyed by heavy rain. Labour demands were high, but labour 
was scarce. It was not known whether to stake the plants or not to stake 
them. When the sun shone they suííered f rom sunscorch and when it rained 
they were victims of mildew. They were variously attacked by wilt, blight 
and eelworm. They were damaged in p idung and packing. Finally, after the 
jolting of a long lorry journey over bad roads they arrived at the canning 
factory having undergone a thorough, but unplanned, form of processing. 
Tomatoes failed. 
17 Pe rke r r a I r r iga t ion Scheme A n n u a l R e p o r t fo r 1965. 
18 Pe rke r r a I r r iga t ion Scheme A n n u a l R e p o r t f o r 1966. 
Dur ing the first six years of the Scheme, attention was so fixed on physical 
development, water management and settling tenants that agricultural re-
search played little par t in deciding cropping policies. In 1960, the Chief 
Research Officer of the Ministry of Agriculture wrote tha t : 
". . . n o las t ing progress can be expected on this scheme unless a d e q u a t e provis ion is 
m a d e fo r researdi . Scheme h is tory to da t e indicates t ha t the p rov is ion of faci l i t ies 
f o r researd i came about more as an a f l e r though t than as a recognised and p l a n n e d 
p r ecu r so r f o r sound development."1 1 1 
In the early 1960s more effort went into research. Beef and bananas did 
well, but onions which had already shown promise were so successful that 
they were rapidly adopted as the main cash crop for the Scheme. 
At first there were serious problems in onion production. Most of the 1961 
crop was wiped out by an unknown disease. Later, however, this was 
diagnosed as blast and a control was found for it. A Texan onion expert 
p rov ided by U S A I D gave valuable advice and various other difficulties 
were overcome. Much managerial effort and ingenuity went into organising 
and operat ing systems of onion cult ivation, spraying and harvesting to 
achieve high yields, high quality, and almost continous production. Compared 
with crops tried earlier tenant co-operation was good as long as prices were 
acceptable. 
Tab le 3. O n i o n A c r e a g e s a n d Y i e l d s 
S e a s o n A c r e s o f T r a n s p l a n t s T o t a l Y i e l d 
( T o n s) 
M e a n Y i e l d 
( T o n s per A c r e ) 
B e f o r e 1 9 6 0 / 6 1 N o t k n o w n N o t k n o w n N o t k n o w n 
1 9 6 0 / 6 1 N o t k n o w n 1 7 4 ' N o t k n o w n 
1 9 6 1 / 6 2 6 2 3 6 0 . 5 8 
1 9 6 2 / 6 3 2 5 3 7 6 0 3 . 0 0 
1 9 6 3 / 6 4 4 1 6 1 , 1 3 0 2 . 7 2 
1 9 6 4 / 6 5 3 9 0 7 7 6 1 . 9 8 
1 9 6 5 / 6 6 5 7 0 2 , 4 4 2 4 . 2 8 
1 9 6 6 / 6 7 4 4 3 1 , 8 9 4 4 . 2 7 
1 9 6 7 / 6 8 6 7 3 2 , 3 7 2 3 . 5 2 
• T o n s of t e n a n t - g r o w n onions sold by the Scheme dur ing 1960. A n u n k n o w n a d -
d i t i o n a l q u a n t i t y r emained unsold a t the end of 1960. 
Sources: Pe r sona l C o m m u n i c a t i o n , 29. 11. 68, f r o m the Manage r , P e r k e r r a I r r iga t ion 
Scheme, fo r the 1960/61 y i e l d ; N a t i o n a l I r r iga t ion B o a r d , Gene ra l 
M a n a g e r ' s A n n u a l R e p o r t 1966-1967 , (mimeo) , p . 12 for 1961/62 and 
1962/63; and P e r k e r r a I r r i g a t i o n Scheme A n n u a l R e p o r t 1967-1968 , p . 5 
fo r subsequent seasons. 
19 Chief Research Of f ice r , " A n O u t l i n e of Research Objec t ives against the Back-
g round of a Suggested Pol icy fo r the P e r k e r r a I r r i ga t i on Scheme", (mimeo) , 
22. 1. 60. 
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Unfor tunate ly , as product ion problems were solved, market ing problems 
emerged. The high cost high qual i ty onions f rom Perkerra could not be 
marketed at prices which would be economic for the Scheme and still 
compete with onions grown elsewhere. At first a protected market was 
par t ly assured by a tariff against onions imported f rom outside the East 
Afr ican Common Market , par t icular ly f rom India and the U A R . Then, in 
1964, there was increasing pressure f rom rain-grown onions f rom N o r t h e r n 
Tanzania , the import of which was banned by the Kenya Government in 
1965. Then competition was experienced f rom rain-grown onions f r o m 
within Kenya itself, f rom Bungoma and Machakos. Moreover, the 1967 » 
Treaty for East Afr ican Co-operat ion provided for the removal of restric-
tions on onion imports f rom Tanzania by December 197020. The most deci-
sive.blow carne, however, f r om large-scale farmers growing irrigated onions 
near Naivasha in Kenya. With the advantages of good soil conditions, loca-
tions closer to the main markets, especially Nairobi , and more diversified 
economies, they were able to obtain higher yields than the Scheme, could 
sell their onions more cheaply, and appeared better able to tolerate price 
fluctuations. 
In these competitive conditions, prices received for Scheme onions declined. 
The mean price for Grade I onions credited to the farmer net of charges 
for the six year period f rom July 1961 through June 1967 was 26.38 cents 
per pound; for the period July 1967 through June 1968 it was only 15.86 
cents per pound, having dropped to a derisory 3.24 cents per pound in 
February 196821. In conditions of free competition and wi th the East 
Afr ican Common Market it seemed impossible wi thout addi t ional heavy 
subsidisation, for onions to remain the cash staple of the Scheme. In 1968, 
after fifteen years of life, Perkerra had once again become a project in search 
of a crop and an economy. 
3. P r o b l e m s of T e n a n t s a n d Sta f f 
Many of the difficulties of the Scheme, especially in its early stages, con-
cerned tenant management. Tenants were selected at first by the Provincial 
Administrat ion, and later by a committee including the Manager and some 
tenants. The tenants who were selected varied widely in their characteristics 
and interests and in their degree of commitment to the Scheme. An indication 
of the early difficulties is given by the instability of early set t lement: of 
20 Treaty for East African Co-operation, p r i n t ed on behalf of the Eas t A f r i c a n 
C o m m o n Services O r g a n i z a t i o n by the G o v e r n m e n t P r in t e r , N a i r o b i , J u n e 1967, 
Ar t ic le 13 and A n n e x I I I . 
21 These figures are der ived f r o m P e r k e r r a I r r iga t ion Scheme A n n u a l R e p o r t f o r 
1967/68. 
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the first 47 tenants, 17 were evicted for bad work and five left of their own 
accord; and of the 241 tenants at the end of 1958, only 114 remained at the 
end of the following year. 
This rapid turnover was related to several factors. The terms of settlement 
were uncertain. It was not clear whether the settlers would be provided 
with houses, as they expected, or whether they would have to build their 
own, as official policy carne to require. There was indecisión over whether 
the houses should be in villages or on individual plots. There was confusion 
over the rate that was to be diarged to each tenant for his four-acre holding: 
the original suggestion in the 1936 report had been Shs. 7 an acre, but the 
authorities in Nairobi proposed Shs. 300 an acre, to the dismay of the 
tenants who were still disturbed when it was subsequently reduced to Shs. 70. 
Yet another difficulty was that the cropping requirements of the Sdieme 
conflicted with what the tenants perceived as their interests. Many of the 
tenants were illiterate and more familiar with a subsistence than with a 
cash economy. Although maize was expected to be less profitabie than 
various alternative cash crops, the tenants accorded it a higher priority, 
presumably because it provided them with their food staple, but also in 
some cases probably because local sale of maize, outside the official machinery 
which maintained a controlled price, could be very profitabie. The divergent 
interests of tenants and management carne to a head in 1958 over the issue 
of a second crop. The first crop was maize which yielded well. The tenants 
harvested it, stored some, gave some away to relatives, and probably sold 
some. The management then sought to persuade them to grow a cash crop 
of groundnuts, which they were reluctant, indeed mostly refused, to do. 
This passive resistance was attributed to their having already secured a 
year's food supply, to the strangeness of the idea of growing a second crop 
in a year, to groundnuts being unfamiliar and not perceived as a food crop, 
and to the realisation that the water rate would be deducted from the 
proceeds whereas otherwise it would be difficult for the management to col-
lect it22. When tenants were subsequently prosecuted for non-payment of 
water rates, many of them left the Sdieme23. 
When onions for a time proved a source of relatively high incomes, settle-
tment was more stable, tenant morale was reported to be high, and the 
management was able to exercise closer disciplinary control over tenant 
22 P e r k e r r a I r r iga t ion Scheme A n n u a l R e p o r t f o r 1957/58. 
23 I t is an in teres t ing possibi l i ty t ha t this crisis m a y have t ended to d r ive a w a y 
f r o m the Scheme the poo re r people w h o lacked outs ide sources of m o n e y to p a y 
their w a t e r rates, whi l e those w i t h outs ide resources m a y h a v e t ended more to 
remain th rough being able to p a y their rates. If this happened , it wil l 
have acted as a selection mechanism fo r t enan t s w i th outs ide interests, precisely 
those w h o m the m a n a g e m e n t f o u n d it more di f f icul t to con t ro l and w h o m it was 
less i m p o r t a n t to he lp . 
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performance. But high tenant incomes exacerbated other problems. As their 
income rose, some tenants treated the Scheme more as a business interest 
than as a place of settlement. Some tenants, through the use of aliases or 
the ñames of cióse relatives, acquired more than one holding; others sublet 
their holdings; yet others left their holdings in the charge of labourers while 
they themselves devoted their main attention to off-scheme interests, some 
of these being no doubt financed by their previous scheme incomes. In all 
these cases, because the tenant was absent and the labourers might or might 
not be present, it was difficult for the management to ensure that manual 
tasks necessary to cultivation were carried out. 
Further obstacles to effective management aróse from communication and 
organisation. Especially in the early days, confusion could arise from the 
use of Swahili, a language foreign to both tenants and management. More-
over, tenant organisation was bedevilled by divisions between the two main 
tribal groups, Njemps and Tugen. This was complicated by the land having 
been originally Njemps, but Tugen having a better record of performance as 
tenants, and in the early 1960s by the two groups supporting rival political 
parties. Far from providing the Manager with an opportunity to divide and 
rule, the tribal split made his task more delicate for any appearance of 
siding with one group or the other might lead to protest within the Scheme 
or intervention from without. 
Managerial staff, too, had their problems. The conflicts of interest between 
them and the tenants were demoralising, but there were also other adverse 
factors. In the early days, a hot climate, mosquitoes, social isolation, and 
the tensions of living in a small expatriate community all took their toll of 
patience and tolerance. Letters written in these circumstances were some-
times outspoken, and the authorities in Nairobi seemed remote and unsympa-
thetic, for instance when an attempt to obtain a special hardship allowance 
for staff at Marigat was turned down. Before the formation of a National 
Irrigation Board in 1966, irrigation was regarded as a backwater, with negli-
gible promotion prospects compared with equivalent work in the Depart -
ment of Agriculture. Moreover, Perkerra was a lower priority scheme than 
its more successful and more prestigious twin, the Mwea Irrigation Settle-
ment, and received fewer visits, less staff and less attention. Further, any 
manager of Perkerra was bound to feel that however hard and ably he 
worked, the Scheme might ultimately fail or be abandoned, leaving him 
with an unjustified stigma for the rest of his career. Finally, in the 1950s 
the stress of management was aggravated by inter-departmental compe-
tition and by a confusion of chains of command which meant that the 
Manager found himself working to several masters, each with different 
¡deas about what the Scheme was for and how it should be run. 
4. P r o b l e m s of O r g a n l s a t i o n a n d C o n t r o l 
During the 1950s, although relations between the stafí of different de-
par tments on the Scheme were often good, there w:ere conflicts of interest to 
be resolved. For instance, the use of detainee labour was a source of dis-
pute. A t first, the DC ' s prime concern was that labour should be used on 
road work , while the Engineer required it for development work on the 
irr igation system, and the A L D E V (African Land Development Organisat ion) 
Manager wanted it for cultivation. At the same time, the Prisons Depar t -
ment whid i controlled the labour was concerned with security, rehabili tation 
and repatr ia t ion, aiming in fact at the removal of the labour forcé altogether. 
The preoccupat ion with security carne to a head with the first maize crop, 
when the Prisons stafí would not at first allow detainees to enter maize that 
was over five feet high for fear they would drop down, crawl away and 
escape. 
Another form of competit ion was between the Engineer and the A L D E V 
Manager over the use to be made of the first twenty acres that could be 
irr igated. The Engineer wanted to carry out water applicat ion experiments; 
the Manager wanted to start crop triáis. The Engineer prevailed, and 
crop triáis were delayed. 
A more prolonged difference of opinion aróse over the fo rm of field layout. 
The agriculturalists, concerned with ease of management, favoured levelling 
the ground into a system of basins which could be flooded. This, they argued, 
would be similar to t radi t ional Njemps irrigation and therefore easy to 
introduce to the tenants. In addit ion, water control would be simple. The 
engineers, however, were interested in water economy. Basin irrigation, they 
held, would be ex t ravagant with water, while a system of f u r r o w irrigation 
on evenly graded slopes would be more economical, a l though water 
management would be more difficult. Only after four years when it had 
become clear that basin irrigation would be overrun by a weed called nut-
grass was a final decisión taken and fu r row irrigation adopted. 
There was also uncertainty and indeed confusion over financial aspects of 
the Scheme. Funds were available f rom two sources — A L D E V , and 
Emergency funds — but the criteria for allocation between them were not 
clear. The A L D E V funds, normal ly administered by local councils, were han-
dled by the Depar tmen t of Agriculture in the provincial capital 65 miles f r om 
the Scheme, but expendi ture was incurred principal ly by the Public Works 
Depar tmen t . In these circumstances cióse accounting control was not easy. 
Ñ o r at first was there any clear understanding of the financial position of 
the Scheme. In 1956 the P C wrote : 
" T o da t e . . . none of us are a w a r e w h a t p a r t of the f u n d s are loan f u n d s , w h a t w e 
shall be r equ i red to p a y back and when , and we have never been given a gua ran t ee 
by the T r e a s u r y t h a t the revenue f r o m this scheme will def in i te ly accrue to the 
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scheme. H o w (we) can be expected to p lan and budge t fo r the f u t u r e u n d e r these 
c i rcumstances I do not k n o w . " 2 4 
These uncertainties were highlighted by a prolonged wrangle over the 
disposal of the first maize crop. The Prisons Department claimed that since 
detainee labour had grown the maize, it should be allocated to supplement 
Prisons' rations. The Administration at district and provincial level claimed 
that since the crop had been grown on Njemps land, it should be sold and the 
revenue credited to the local council. The Treasury view was that the maize 
should be sold but the proceeds credited to general Government revenue. 
At a late stage in the involved correspondence the Director of Agriculture 
wrote that if the argument continued he would recommend the growing of 
melons instead of maize. The maize crop was, however, sold, and the 
proceeds paid into the local council. When faced with a demand that the 
sum be transferred to Government revenue, the P C gamely replied that the 
local council had been intending to invest the money and asked if the 
Treasury would pay interest. He went on: 
" I am a f r a i d my off icers are still no t convinced of the s a f e ty of these f u n d s if pa id 
to the T reasu ry . T h e y feel tha t the off icers of the T r e a s u r y and the Minis te r m a y 
change, and tha t the pressing needs of o the r P rov inces migh t pe r suade the T r e a s u r y 
or Legislat ive Counc i l to vote the money e lsewhere ." 2 5 
But the P C was overruled at a high level and the sum was paid over to the 
Treasury. 
Control and administration of the Scheme were also complicated by depart-
mental attitudes. At the technical level on the Scheme, as we have seen, the 
engineers and agriculturalists had different priorities. But at a higher 
organisational level there were deeper differences concerning how the 
Scheme should be controlled. The General Manager appointed in 1956 to 
supervise irrigation projects in Kenya argued for the setting up of a largely 
autononious central board which would be independent of the Provincial 
Administration. He wrote: 
"I f a n y p rob lem concern ing G o v e r n m e n t admin i s t r a t i on should arise the M a n a g e r 
of the Sdieme w o u l d be f ree to consul t wi th the local Dis t r i c t Commiss ione r or 
r ega rd ing hea l th w i th the P rov inc i a l Medica l Of f i ce r , etc., bu t I feel it w o u l d 
be unwise to m a k e you r M a n a g e r subservient to a local C o m m i t t e e of M a n a g e m e n t 
w h o m a y have w ide ly d iverg ing views f r o m his. H e is the M a n a g e r of the Scheme, 
responsible for runn ing it cor rec t ly and he should no t need to be to ld w h a t to do 
by a n y local B o a r d . . . H e w o u l d n a t u r a l l y f o l l o w a n y po l i cy la id d o w n by 
the C e n t r a l Board . P u t in a good manage r and let him r u n it. T h e local G o v e r n -
ment Off ic ia l s are cons tan t ly changing and there is no real con t inu i ty so it is real ly 
best to leave them out of it except fo r consu l ta t ion w h e n necessary ." 2 9 
24 Let ter , P C Rif l Val ley P rov ince to Secre ta ry fo r Agr icu l tu re , 4. 6. 56. 
25 Let ter , P C Ri f l Val ley P rov ince to the Secre ta ry fo r Agr icu l tu re , 17. 4. 56. 
26 Genera l Manage r , I r r iga t ion D e v e l o p m e n t Projects , M e m o r á n d u m on the O r -
ganisa t ion of I r r iga t ion , ca. Apr i l 1956. 
359 
H e favoured putt ing in well paid high calibre managers who would work 
direct to him, as General Manager, in Nairobi , and whose main concern 
would be efficient production. 
The Administrat ion took a very different view. The P C stated that the 
Perkerra Scheme was "not a Government Estate for making money, growing 
produce and employing labour" but was "a settlement and land rehabilita-
tion scheme"27. I t was par t of an integrated policy for moving people out 
of the forests they were destroying and resettling them where they could 
irr ígate with the water supply thereby preserved and protected. The 
Adminis t ra t ion claimed the right to handle many aspects of the Scheme such 
as land matters, local council cesses, and tenant selection. In part icular , 
objections were raised to an exclusive managerial staff paid more than other 
Government officers and encouraged to go its own way. These views 
prevai led. The proposals for a central board were defeated and during the 
1950s the Administrat ion retained considerable influence over Scheme 
policy. 
Tab le 4. T h e P e r k e r r a L o c a l C o m m i t t e e 
Y e a r 
N u m b e r o f 
M e e t i n g s 
N u m b e r of 
M e m b e r s C h a i r m a n M e m b c t s h i p 
1 9 5 4 4 
( A u g - D e c ) 
4 P A O P A O 
D C 
Div is iona l Engineer , P W D 
M a n a g e r 
1 9 5 5 7 4 P A O 
1 9 5 6 3 4 - 6 P A O plus Medica l D e p a r t m e n t Represen ta t ive 
plus Genera l M a n a g e r , I r r iga t ion ( G M I ) 
1 9 5 7 1 1 6 - 7 G M I plus D O 
1 9 5 8 9 7 - 8 G M I plus Tugen Rep re sen t a t i ve 
1 9 5 9 6 8 - 1 0 D C plus V e t e r i n a r y R e p r e s e n t a t i v e 
plus Agr i cu l tu r e R e p r e s e n t a t i v e 
Source: Minu tes of the P e r k e r r a Local C o m m i t t e e 1954-1959 . 
Notes: P A O = Prov inc ia l Agr icu l tu ra l O f f i c e r ; D C = Di s t r i c t Commiss ioner ; 
G M I = . Genera l M a n a g e r , I r r iga t ion D e v e l o p m e n t P ro j ec t s ; D O = Dis t r i c t 
Of f i ce r . 
A c t u a l a t t endances were usual ly s l ight ly l a rge r t h a n the f o r m a l membersh ip 
as a resul t of persons being present by inv i t a t i on . 
Much of this influence was exercised through the Perkerra Local Committee, 
the composition and attendances of which f rom 1954 through 1960 are 
summarised in Table 4. Init ial ly a small pol icy-making and executive body 
27 Le t te r , P C Ri f t Val ley P rov ince to Secre ta ry fo r A f r i c a n Af fa i r s , 20. 6. 56. (PC ' s 
unde r l i n ing ) . 
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which directed the Scheme, it grew in size in response to external pressures 
for representation, and as it grew its functions shifted f rom decisión and 
direction to discussion and advice. When tenant representatives were added 
in 1963, its meetings became less regular, but its form was retained in an 
executive committee consisting only of officials. By 1968 it had lapsed. 
During the 1950s, however, it was a fo rum for expressing and at tempting to 
resolve differences of opinion and policy and it represented scheme interests 
to the authorities in Nairobi . Despite the existence of this committee, 
however, there was still a tendency for officers of different departments in 
the course of their unsynchronised visits to issue conflicting instructions to 
staff on the Scheme so that the Manager in part icular sometimes found that 
he had to work to different masters with different ideas of wha t should be 
done. In the early 1960s, however, the Manager came more clearly under the 
Director of Agriculture, and with the creation of the Na t iona l Irrigation 
Board in 1966 the process of detachment f rom local officials was carried 
even fur ther , leaving the Manager with a freer hand in pursuing his technical 
agricultural objectives. 
I I I . S o m e C o n c l u d i n g L e s s o n s 
M a n y lessons could be culled f rom the Perkerra experience. Only some of 
the more obvious and impor tant will be mentioned here. 
In the first place, the high costs and risks of hasty development wi th 
inadequate surveys are abundant ly clear. To embark upon a major irrigation 
project with little knowledge of river flows and with wha t limited know-
ledge there is indicating unreliabili ty; wi thout any assurance that a cash crop 
can be grown and marketed; wi thout experience of tenants ' per formance; 
and without any pilot project — these are to court disaster. Moreover, one 
effect of such ignorance is to encourage overinvestment in unprofi table 
directions which have then to be abandoned: the 430 acres of basin irr igation 
which were overrun by nutgrass, and the extensive cult ivation, before 
adequate triáis had been carried out, of tomatoes, groundnuts and even 
onions. When, as has occurred at Perkerra , most of the experimental work 
is carried out not on a researdi station but with tenants on their plots the 
risks of failure are multiplied by the dangers of tenant dissatisfaction, of 
loss of confidence in the management, of absenteeism, and ul t imately of 
permanent depar ture f rom the scheme. 
Second, when a complex project requiring a favourable coincidence of 
several interdependent factors begins to run into trouble, difficulties tend 
to compound one another. On Perkerra, lack of water has sonietimes limited 
the acreage that can be irrigated, in turn limiting returns to tenants and 
revenue to the Scheme, increasing the dependence of the Scheme on subsidy 
and aggravating the problems of tenant management. Unstable onion prices 
have affected tenant and stafí morale as well as revenue. Evictions and other 
disciplinary measures to secure effective tenant performance may be part ly 
self-defeating by reducing the tenants' sense of security on a scheme and 
encouraging them to spend more time and energy on their off-scheme 
activities. Such chain reactions as these make heavy demands both on 
managerial ski11 and patience and on the financial resources of a parent 
organisation. Where a scheme has, like Perkerra, a generally unfavourable 
physical environment and narrow technical limits of tolerance, able manage-
ment may reduce or cushion some of these reactions but is unlikely always 
to overcome them. In these circumstances, financial support of various forms 
becomes the variable that is easiest to manipúlate, with the result that a 
scheme is maintained but at a heavy cost to the rest of the economy. 
A third lesson emerges from the process of creeping commitment to the 
Scheme, starting with the first ideas of replacing the indigenous irrigation 
which had been destroyed, leading to preliminary surveys and then to a 
situation in which the idea of irrigation was at large and ready to be seized 
on whenever an opportunity presented itself. There was never any meeting 
or moment at which a decisión to implement the Scheme was clearly taken. 
Even the siting of the camp at Marigat was only part ly associated with the 
possibility of irrigation. But the very presence and use of the labour; the 
posting in of stafí; the allocation of funds; the physical developments such 
as building the camp, construction of the weir, and land preparat ion; the 
deepening enthusiasms of individual officials and the increasing involvement 
of departmental interests; the visits of VIPs to inspect progress; the selection, 
induction and management of tenants; the growing and marketing of 
crops - all these in múltiple ways progressively secured the Scheme as a 
permanent entity and strengthened its capacity to survive. It became in-
creasingly difficult to cióse it down. To abandon the Scheme would haVe 
meant to accept failure, to write off heavy government expenditure, and to 
have to resettle tenants, transfer stafí, and save a number of faces. It was 
always easier and involved less immediate acceptance of responsibility to 
allow the Scheme to continué. The chance in 1962 when the tenants could 
have been resettled in the former European highlands was allowed to slip, 
and by 1968, with some 500 tenants to varying degrees dependent on the 
Scheme, closure had become politically and humanly difficult even to 
contémplate. 
A fourth observation is that the true costs of a project like Perkerra may 
usually be greater than their apparent costs. To evalúate any scheme is, of 
course, a complex operation with several quantifiable and many un-
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quantifiable factors to be taken ¡nto account; and, to be sure, even with 
Perkerra there have been hidden benefits — learning on the part of the 
tenants, including their introduction to a cash economy; experience gained 
by government officials; investment of incomes generated by the Scheme; 
indirect government revenue; and seasonal employment, among others. But 
schemes which are heavily committing in terms of capital expenditure, 
departmental and individual involvement, and political interest and support 
tend to receive a perverse protection: the levels of external support and of 
tolerance in evaluation vary inversely with their economic performance. 
Except in stringent economic evaluations, "success" for a scheme like 
Perkerra is defined in less exacting terms than for an economically more 
viable scheme such as Mwea. Protective standards of assessment and hidden 
subsidies are easily combined to give a false impression of favourable 
economic performance. Moreover, a scheme such as Perkerra has to be 
evaluated not just in isolation but in terms of benefits foregone from alter-
native uses of the resources involved - especially capital, managerial 
competence and effort, and labour. H a d the sum of over £500,000 and the 
human resouj-ces invested in Perkerra by 1968 been used in other ways, the 
results might have been substantial benefits instead of continuing indefinite 
liabilities. 
These four lessons — the costs and risks of liaste and ignorance; the 
compounding of problems in complex projects; the irreversibility of the 
creep of commitment; and the high true costs of poor projects — combine 
in a criterion applicable to choices in agricultural development. The Perkerra 
Irrigation Scheme, with its requirement from the start of complex and con-
tinuing organisation involving government support, can be contrasted as a 
policy with the implications of an incident in the history of the Scheme. In 
1961 the Manager noted that "A tenant was given a sample of Taboran maize 
seed which ripened about four weeks earlier than the local variety and yielded 
at a rate of 11 bags per acre. The tenant concerned was besieged by others 
wanting seed to plant"2 8 . This was, of course, an event on an irrigation 
scheme, but the implications are wider and apply to non-irrigated agriculture. 
The contrast here is between on the one hand a major project like Perkerra 
which requires on-going government involvement, and on the other program-
óles like the introduction of a new seed variety which can be one-shot 
efforts. In a major project the risks and liabilities are shouldered by govern-
28 P e r k e r r a I r r iga t ion Scheme A n n u a l R e p o r t fo r 1961. 
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ment: if the project succeeds, government is obliged to continué to service 
and manage it; if it fails, it may prove politically and administratively 
impossible to abandon it. In the one-shot programme, however, the risks and 
liabilities are accepted by the individual farmers: if the innovation succeeds, 
it is propagated without further government intervention; if it fails, it is 
quickly and easily abandoned by the farmers without additional cost or 
administration for government. There are, of course, a great many other 
considerations which bear on policy choices; but capital and administrative 
capacity are typically scarce resources to be used sparingly; and in choosing 
between alternative approaches to agricultural development there is a case, 
other things being equal, for preferring those which are cheap, simple, 
administration-sparing and easy to withdraw from to those which are 
expensive, complex, administration-intensive and committing. 
It is not enough merely to be aware of these considerations; there must also 
be a climate and madiinery in government to make sure that they are taken 
into account. In British colonial government in East Africa in the 1950s there 
was a relative absence of economic criteria in official thinking and a 
readiness to support the initiative of officers at the local level when they 
promoted projects. There was sympathetic backing in the Kenya central 
government for the visión and enthusiasm of the civil servants at provincial 
and district level who energetically launched the Perkerra Irrigation Scheme. 
Entrepreneurial capacity of the sort whidi they demonstrated is certainly an 
asset to a government, but as the Perkerra story shows it can be dangerous 
unless it is controlled. What is needed is a powerful and perceptive presence 
in governments which, while not stifling local initiatives, ensures that schemes 
as unpromising as Perkerra are never begun; for it is fa r easier to prevent a 
bad project than, once it has been started, to cióse it down. 
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